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Abstract 
The media coverage of the same tragic event (the MH17 case) was framed in 
conflicting ways in Russia and the West. Media frames drew on longstanding public 
discourses to generalize on the moral nature of the different actors that were held 
responsible for the incident. This study applied a content analysis to the media 
coverage of the MH17 incident in Dutch, Russian and U.S. newspapers. Thus, it 
measured to what extent media frames reflected public discourses and how these 
frames were built up. The results showed that Russian and Western media employed 
conflicting media frames and drew on public discourses that instigate moral outrage 
against the country that was held responsible for the incident. Whereas the U.S. most 
often employed a terror frame that reflected an Anti-Russian discourse, Russian 
media employed more often the counterframe of conspiracy that reflected an Anti-
Ukrainian or Anti-Russian discourse. This study thus showed how the same tragic 
event was framed in different and conflicting ways in Russia and the West, and how 
this coverage was tainted by longstanding public discourses.  
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1. Introduction 
Shortly after Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (hereinafter referred to as MH17) was 
downed over Eastern Ukraine on July 17
th
 2014, different and conflicting narratives 
of the incident abounded in the coverage in both Russian and Western media. The 
U.S. newspaper The Washington Times reported that “initial reports indicate the 
Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 was shot out of the sky by a more substantial, ground-
based Russian missile system” (Taylor 2014). On the same day, the Russian 
newspaper Komsomol’skaya Pravda published an article with the headline “Downing 
of an airliner: final conclusions without preliminary research.”1 In this article, the 
newspaper reported on the “many strange coincidences that accompanied this flight – 
the change of the conventional route, confusion of the Ukrainian military in 
testimonies on the presence or absence of a BUK [missile launcher] in the hands of 
militias, posts at a microblog of Spanish air traffic controllers working at Borispol 
aiport [suggesting that Ukrainian air forces shot down the plane], the striking 
efficiency of Ukrainian mass media that in only a few minutes after the plane had 
disappeared from the rader screens categorically stated that it was shot down, and 
much more versions [of the incident]” (Grishin 2014). The Dutch newspaper De 
Volkskrant published an article with the headline “Tragedy above Ukraine takes the 
lives of 298 people”2 (Redactie & NAP 2014), focusing mainly on the tragic nature 
and technical details of the incident. Western and Russian media thus framed the 
MH17 incident in different and conflicting ways. 
This study aims at analyzing how a tragic event was framed in different and 
conflicting ways in international media. To that end, it examined to what extent media 
frames drew upon longstanding public discourses that already existed long before the 
                                                        
1 “Падение лайнера: окончательные выводы без предварительного расследования” (Grishin 
2014). 
2 “Tragedie boven Oekraïene kost 298 mensen het leven” (Redactie & NAP 2014). 
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incident took place (Entman 1993, p. 11). These discourses were used to make sense 
of a tragic event for which different actors were accused and generalize on the moral 
nature of this actor. The actor is usually generalized to the government of one of the 
involved countries. Different countries held different actors responsible for bringing 
about the MH17 incident. This mechanism of media frames that reflect public 
discourses was applied in a content analysis of the coverage of the MH17 case. This 
content analysis was informed by framing theory. Framing was thus used as a tool to 
analyze the conflicting narratives of the MH17 incident in Russian and Western 
media. 
The main point of conflict in the media coverage of the MH17 incident was 
that Russia and the West accused each other of downing the civilian airliner. Three 
countries with different interests and different reasons of involvement in the MH17 
incident were therefore chosen for this content anslysis: The Netherlands, Russia and 
the U.S. The Netherlands was involved because almost two-thirds of the victims were 
Dutch and moral outrage was particularly high in this country. The U.S. was involved 
because the U.S. government soon took a clear stance on the incident: already a few 
days after the incident had taken place, the U.S. State Department published a report 
in which it held pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region responsible for 
shooting down the airliner (Westcott 2014). Furthermore, it is interesting to find out 
whether U.S. media use Anti-Russian rhetoric, taking into account that some Russian 
media often employed Anti-American rhetoric in their coverage on the incident. 
Russia is involved because the MH17 incident took place over a territory that is 
controlled by pro-Russian seperatists. These separatists were allegedly supported by 
Russia. Furthermore, the Russian government and media disseminated significant 
amounts of counter-narratives on the incident (Wilder 2014). 
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This study aims to measure to what extent the media frames of the coverage of 
a tragic event (the MH17 incident) in Dutch, Russian and U.S. media reflected public 
discourses. Further, it aims to analyze how exactly these frames were built up. This 
will provide insights in how the incident was framed differently in Russian and 
Western media. Scholars have studied media frames since the 1970s (Cissel 2012, p. 
68). The linkage between media frames and public discourses has rarely been 
researched, though (Entman 1991). This study aims to fill that gap by providing a 
theoretical framework that shows how media frames reflected public discourses in 
order to make sense of a tragic event. This theoretical framework was applied to a 
multi-language content analysis of the coverage of the same tragic event (Khakimova 
Storie, Madden & Liu 2014). This event was analyzed across different countries (The 
Netherlands, Russia and the U.S.) and languages (Dutch, English and Russian). Such 
a content analysis across different countries and languages is rare (e.g. Ermolaeva 
2014). Furthermore, this study aims at making journalists and audiences more aware 
of how the coverage of a tragic event could be tainted by longstanding public 
discourses. This could contradict one of the most fundamental principles of the media: 
representing reality as objective and truthful as possible. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Tragic Event: the MH17 Case 
On July 17
th
 2014, flight MH17 bound for Kuala Lumpur had departed from 
Amsterdam airport at 12:15 p.m. local time. Contact with the plane was lost over 
Ukrainian airspace at 2:15 p.m. By that time the plane flew at about 50 kilometers 
from the Russian-Ukrainian border. The plain was probably shot down. Wreckage of 
the plane came down near the East-Ukrainian town of Torez. None of the 183 
passengers and 15 crew aboard survived. The incident dominated international media 
for a large part of the summer of 2014 and it caused moral outrage, particularly in The 
Netherlands and Malaysia. Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, said that 
“everybody knew someone who was on flight MH17” (NOS 2014). The narratives on 
the causes of the incident differed per country: whereas Western media often reported 
that the plane was shot down by Pro-Russian separatists backed by Russia, Russian 
media often came up with alternative explanations and blamed the Ukrainian military. 
It is important to note that at the time of writing this thesis, all (judicial) investigations 
into the MH17 incident were still open. 
 
2.2 Public Discourses: Theory 
This study assumes that media frames reflect public discourses. Media frames draw 
on longstanding public discourses to make sense of a tragic event, and to generalize 
on the moral nature of the actor. This actor is generalized to the government of one of 
the involved countries. The public discourses that media frames draw on, existed 
already long before the tragic event took place. A public discourse is “a particular set 
of ideas and symbols that are used in various public forums to construct meaning 
about [policy issues]” (Gamson 1992, p. 24). Entman (1991) involves public 
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discourses in a framing analysis of the coverage of the KAL and Iran Air incidents. 
These cases in which civil airliners were downed, are very similar to the MH17 
incident: the governments of the actors (U.S. and the Soviet Union) were held 
responsible. In the analysis of these incidents, Entman adds a culture-specific element 
to the definition of public discourses: “a series of associated idea clusters that form a 
way of reasoning about a matter that is familiar to audiences from other cultural 
experiences” (p. 11). This definition is particularly useful to this this study, which 
aims to analyze the media coverage of a tragic event across different countries, 
languages and thus cultures. 
Governments and media outlets in different countries construct public 
discourses. Governments are the “key catalyst” behind the construction of public 
discourses (Entman, 1991, p. 13-14). Together with the media, governments construct 
and disseminate longstanding public discourses that suit their interests (Anderson 
2007, Luke 2007 as cited in Thomas 2009). To that end, they disseminate their 
stances on policy issues by means of public addresses, official statements, etc. 
Relevant to this study are public discourses that contain an ethical assessment” of 
another country or government (Entman 1991, p. 13). This assessment is often based 
on condemnation or dislike of that country’s policies. As this study analyzes the 
media coverage of a tragic event for which different countries accuse each other, the 
discourses that are relevant are based on dislike of one of the involved countries (i.e. 
Russia, Ukraine or the U.S.). These ‘anti-discourses’ of dislike of the other country 
existed already long before the tragic event take place, and when the MH17 inciden 
took place, media frames drew again on these discourses to make sense of what 
happened. 
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2.3 Public Discourses: The Case of MH17 
Table 1 shows the public discourses that are relevant to the MH17 case. These include 
a neutral, technical discourse that is applicable to any tragic event. Next to that, three 
moral ‘anti-discourses’ are relevant. These discourses are specific to the MH17 case, 
as they are based on dislike of one of the involved countries (Russia, Ukraine or the 
U.S.). These ‘anti-discourses’ generalize on the moral nature of the actor. The actors 
that were accused of bringing about the MH17 incident were generalized to their 
countries or governments: for example, the Russian government was held responsible 
for the acts of Pro-Russian separatists or Russian soldiers, whereas the Ukrainian 
government was held responsible for the acts of its military. 
 
Table 1. Definitions of Public Discourses. 
Public Discourse Definition 
1. Technical This discourse holds that the tragic event “was traceable not to 
moral failure but to inadequacies of technology and of humans 
to cope with it” (Entman 1991, p. 14). Thus, this discourse holds 
that the incident happened because of technical failure, and thus 
it does not identify an actor who is to be held responsible for the 
incident. It is neutral and does not generalize on the moral 
nature of an actor. Instead, it focuses mainly on the description 
of the technical details of the incident (Entman 1991, p. 15). 
2. Anti-Russian The ‘Anti-Russian’ discourse generalizes on the moral nature of 
the Russian government. It is based on dislike of “Russia as an 
increasingly authoritarian actor in international relations with 
burgeoning (neo) imperial ambitions” (Tsygankov & Fominykh 
2010, p. 19). This discourse is expressed through stances on 
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themes and policy issues such as Putin’s authoritarian regime, 
destruction and lack of democratic freedoms, the “use of the 
‘energy weapon’ as a means of political pressure and blackmail” 
and Russia’s aggressive Foreign Policy towards its neighbours 
in the Post-Soviet Space (Cartalucci 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; 
Tsygankov & Fominykh 2010, p. 20). The Anti-Russian 
discourse has started to develop in the West – particularly in 
Europe – in the second half of the 1990s and grew particularly 
strong during Putin’s second and third terms. 
3. Anti-Ukrainian The ‘Anti-Ukrainian’ discourse generalizes on the moral nature 
of the Ukrainian government. This Anti-Ukrainian sentiment 
(also called Ukrainophobia or Ukrainophilia) is mainly present 
in Russia nowadays. This sentiment appeared before in the 
history of Russia-Ukraine relations. It was for example reflected 
in Anti-Ukrainian policies in the Soviet Union, e.g. the 
Holodomor and mass executions of Ukrainian intellectuals in 
the 1930s (Shkandri 2001, p. 166). Russian state media 
reinvigorated this anti-Ukrainian sentiment from February 2014 
on, when the erstwhile President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych 
was ousted after popular uprisings. The revival of the Anti-
Ukrainian sentiment in Russian society is apparent from a recent 
polling by Levada Center which has shown that 55% of the 
Russians relate negatively to Ukraine (2015). 
4. Anti-American The ‘Anti-American’ discourse generalizes on the moral nature 
of the U.S. government. It is based on dislike of “America’s 
 13 
power, its ‘arrogance,’ its success” (Berman 2004, p. 3). It 
“take[s] this or that policy dispute as a pretext for criticism 
about the United States” (Berman 2004, p. 3). The Russian 
variant of Anti-Americanism primarily directs this criticism at 
the purported aim of the U.S. and its NATO allies to undermine 
Russia’s power in the world through the establishment of 
spheres of influence in the post-Soviet Space (Mearsheimer 
2014). Recent pollings have shown that 81% of the Russians 
relate negatively to the United States (Levada Center 2015) and 
that 54% perceives the U.S. as “the largest threat in the world” 
(Bohm 2014).  
 
2.4 Media systems 
Governments and media in different countries construct and disseminate different and 
sometimes conflicting public discourses. This is done by means of official statements, 
public addresses, etc. These governments and media outlets function within the 
context of different media systems. It is therefore important to be aware of the large 
differences between the media systems of the three countries in this study. 
In the Netherlands and the U.S. - both full-fledged democracies – the media 
play a different role in the political process than under the ‘electoral authoritarian’ 
regime of Russia (Lipman & McFaul 2010; Petrone 2011, p. 167). The governments 
of the Netherlands and the U.S. cannot directly interfer in the news content, as none 
of the Dutch and U.S. media are state-owned (Bakker & Vasterman 2008, p. 148; 
Shah 2009). In both countries, newspapers and television channels are privately 
owned, though some of them receive some state funding. In the media system of the 
Netherlands, television “is dominated by commercial channels on the one hand and a 
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strong public broadcasting system on the other, although there are no national 
government-owned television or radio stations” (Bakker & Vasterman 2008, p. 148). 
Media ownership in the U.S. is more concentrated in the hands of a small amount of 
large businesses (Shah 2009). In Russia, telvision channels are state-owned and 
tightly controlled by the Kremlin, which is reflected in the news content (Lipman & 
McFaul 2010, p. 116). In Russian newspapers there is more variety in terms of 
loyalty: some are owned or closely related to the state, but others are liberal and 
independent. Russian independent newspapers reach only small audiences and have 
limited financial resources (Bertrand 2012). 
Also the main source of news consumption for the publics in these three 
countries differs. The Netherlands has a relatively high readership of newspapers and 
magazines (Bakker & Vasterman 2008, p. 146-148). Whereas large parts of the Dutch 
public are still subscribed to newspapers (Bakker & Vasterman 2008, p. 146-148), 
newspaper readership in the U.S. is declining (Kirchhoff 2009). U.S. citizens 
consume news from a wide range of online sources and television channels 
(Kirchhoff 2009). The largest part of the Russian public is dependent on the state-
controlled television channels, which are their main and only source of news. 
The Netherlands and the U.S. also differ from Russia in terms of freedom of 
the press: whereas The Netherlands was on the 7
th
 and the U.S. on the 46
th
 of the 
World Press Freedom Index 2014, Russia  scored a low 148
th
 place (Freedom House 
2014). Russia, on the one hand, has “media gatekeepers framing international news 
for internal audiences” (Smaele 2004, 66). U.S. media, on the other hand, reach a 
large public abroad thanks to the universality of the English language and 
globalization (Khakimova Storie, Madden & Liu 2014, p. 429). If governments have a 
strong influence on media, media tend to represent the interests of that government. 
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Governments can thus influence the media frames and public discourses that a media 
outlet employes. It is therefore important to be aware of the large differences between 
Russian and Western media systems. 
 
2.5 Framing: Theory 
This content analysis was informed by framing theory in order to analyze the 
conflicting narratives of the same tragic event in international media. Framing is a 
tool to analyze the way media media present information to their audiences (Cissel 
2012, p. 68). Frames encourage the reader to interpret the information in a certain 
way. Goffman was the first researcher to define framing as “a ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ that enables individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’” 
occurrences or life experiences (1974 as cited in Cissel 2012, p. 68). Clawson & 
Oxley define framing in the media as a “...process by which a communication source, 
such as a news organization defines and constructs a political issue or public 
controversy” (1997, p. 567). Entman (1991, 1993) provided a more practical 
definition. He explained in detail how news outlets construct a specific interpretation 
of the perceived reality: media highlight, downplay or ignore certain aspects in a 
media message. In other words, framing is a means of “sizing – magnifying or 
shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient” (Entman 
1991, p. 9). Media increase the salience of certain bits of information by “making 
[them] more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (Entman 1991, p. 
9). Media frames “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” by elevating certain “aspects of 
[the] perceived reality” (Entman 1993, p. 52). Different frames make different pieces 
of information more or less salient. 
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2.6 Framing: Definition of Frame Categories 
The content analysis focused on three categories of media frames that offer different, 
basic narratives of how a tragic event happens: as an unfortunate accident, a criminal 
act or a plot. Table 2 defines the basic content of the tragedy (1), terror (2) and 
conspiracy (3) frames. 
 
Table 2. Definitions of Frame Categories 
Media Frame Definition 
1. Tragedy The tragedy frame ignores or obscures the question of “who did 
wrong” (Entman 1991, p. 13). Instead this frame focuses on “what 
went wrong” (Entman 1991, p. 13). It emphasizes the tragic nature 
of the event and categorizes it explicitly as a ‘tragedy’, ‘disaster’ or 
‘catastrophe’. Contrary to the other frames, this frame does not focus 
on the question of who the actor was and it does not draw on a 
public discourse that generalizes on the moral nature of that actor. 
2. Terror The terror frame categorizes the incident as a deliberate or 
accidental attack and focuses on the “activity and responsibility” 
(Entman 1991, p. 18) of the actor. Dependent on the public 
discourse that is reflected in this frame, “the actor that shot down the 
plane” (Entman 1991, p. 20) is generalized to a certain country 
towards which it directs moral judgment and outrage. 
3. Conspiracy The conspiracy frame is a counter-frame to the terror frame. It offers 
alternative explanations (i.e. conspiracy theories) of how the tragic 
event happened, holding that it was plotted. These alternative 
explanations are opposed to the explanations offered in the terror 
frame. This implies that the conspiracy frame accuses different 
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actors than the terror frame. Further, it also generalizes on the moral 
nature of this actor towards which it directs moral judgment and 
outrage. 
 
2.7 Framing: Frame Dimensions 
Next to the above-described basic content of media frames that focus on how a tragic 
event happened, a frame is composed of additional frame dimensions. These frame 
dimensions are not integral to the above frames, but optional because the usage of 
frame dimensions can differ a lot per frame. These frame dimensions constitute the 
“bits of information” that are made more or less salient in a media frame (Entman 
1993, p. 52). The salience of frame dimensions depends on how much attention a 
frame pays to them: a frame “call[s] attention to particular aspects of the reality 
described, which logically means that frames simultaneously direct attention away 
from other aspects (Entman 1993, p. 54). Thus, a frame emphasizes, de-emphasizes, 
obscures or omits a frame dimension. Furthermore, the salience of frame dimensions 
not merely impacts the content of a frame, but also measures the political importance 
of the incident (Entman 1991, p. 9). Tables 3 shows the definitions of the frame 
dimensions that are used to construct the media frames of a tragic event. 
 
Table 3. Definitions of Frame Dimensions 
Frame Dimension Definition 
1. Attribution of agency This frame dimension differentiates between an active 
and passive “voice” in the description of agency, i.e. the 
“causal force [that] created the newsworthy act” 
(Entman 1991, p. 11-13). This dimension is relevant 
because different actors were held responsible for the 
tragic event, which means that some countries or 
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newspapers had an interest in obscuring the ‘agency’, 
i.e. the “condition” or “state of acting” (Online 
Dictionary, 2015). The choice of an active or passive 
verb can make a big difference: Russia was unwilling to 
support the UN resolution that guaranteed investigators 
“full and unrestricted access” to the crash site if the verb 
‘shooting down’ was not amended to the milder verb of 
‘downing’ (Strange 2014). The passive voice tends to 
obscure the act by describing it in terms of ‘what 
happened’. The active voice describes more explicitly 
‘who has done it’ and thus emphasizes who “actively 
caused the incident” (Entman, 1991, p. 11). Thus, the 
active voice enlarges the frame and the passive voice 
shrinks it (Entman 1991, p. 9). The active voice evokes 
questions over agency and responsibility, whereas the 
passive voice obscures agency. 
2. Specification of agent This frame dimension specifies the actor or ‘agent’, i.e. 
the “person or thing through which power is exerted or 
an end is achieved” (Online Dictionary 2015). It thus 
ascribes agency to a certain actor that is held responsible 
for the tragic event. This dimension is relevant because 
different countries accused different actors for the tragic 
event that happened. The specification of the actor thus 
differs not merely per country and per newspaper, but 
also within frames. Furthermore, this dimension is 
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optional because not all media messages mention an 
actor. 
3. Description of victims This frame dimension codes the manner in which the 
victims were described. Inspired by Entman’s analysis 
(1991), this dimension distinguishes ‘humanizing’ and 
‘neutral’ descriptions of the victims. This dimension is 
relevant because “[t]he contrasting ways that victims 
were identified encodes and exemplifies the difference in 
discursive domains [i.e. public discourses]” (Entman 
1991, p. 15). Humanizing descriptions make the victims 
more visible, as they focus “on the humanity that they 
shared with audience members” (Entman 1991, p. 15). 
This could be done by “provid[ing] imagined details of 
what was going on in flight,” (Entman 1991, p. 17). This 
was for example done in the speech of the erstwhile 
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans to 
the UN Security Council: “I [have been] thinking how 
horrible the final moments of their lives must have been, 
when they knew the plane was going down ... Did they 
lock hands with their loved ones, did they hold their 
children close to their hearts, did they look each other in 
the eyes, one final time, in a wordless goodbye? We will 
never know” (Waterfield 2014). Thus, humanizing 
descriptions “encourag[e] identification and empathy 
with the victims and moral evaluation of the incident 
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(Entman 1991, p. 15). Neutral descriptions minimize the 
role of the victims. Thus, the victims are made “less 
visible” and evoke no empathy from the side of the 
reader (Entman 1991, p. 15). 
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3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As explained in the literature review, this study aimed to measure to what extent 
media frames drew on public discourses in order to make sense of a tragic event. 
These public discourses generalize on the moral nature of the actor that was held 
responsible for the tragic event. These actors were generalized to the governments of 
the involved countries. This theoretical framework was applied to a content analysis 
of the coverage of the MH17 incident in Dutch, Russian and U.S. newspapers. These 
countries were involved in the incident for different reasons and accused different 
actors. Further, this study aimed to measure how these media frames were built up. 
Thus, this study aimed to show how a tragic event (the MH17 case) was framed in 
conflicting ways in Russian and Western media. 
 
The reflection of public discourses in media frames was analyzed with the help of 
three hypotheses. These hypotheses state the expected linkages between media frames 
and public discourses in the coverage of the MH17 incident. 
 
H1: The tragedy frame reflects the technical discourse. 
H2: The terror frame reflects the Anti-Russian discourse. 
H3: The conspiracy frame reflects the Anti-Ukrainian and Anti-American 
discourses. 
 
These expected linkages between public discourses and media frames in the coverage 
of the MH17 incident are also shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the expected linkages between public discourses, media frames and 
media coverage of the MH17 incident. 
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Method: Content Analysis 
As stated above, this study aims at measuring how public discourses were reflected in 
the media frames of the coverage of a tragic event (the MH17 case) and how these 
frames were built up. This was measured in a content analysis on newspaper articles 
in Dutch, Russian and U.S. newspapers that mentioned the MH17 incident. Neuendorf 
defines the “fast-growing” method of content analysis as “a systematic, objective, 
quantitative analysis of message characteristics.” (2002, p. 1). In practical terms, this 
is done through “the systematic assignment of communication content to categorize 
according to rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those categories ...” 
(Riffe, Lacy & Fico 2005, p. 3). This “involves drawing representative samples of 
content [and] training coders to use category rules developed to measure or reflect 
differences in content” (Riffe, Lacy & Fico 2005, p. 3). Subsequently, “[t]he collected 
data are ... usually analyzed to describe typical patterns or characteristics or to 
identify important relationships among the content qualities examined” (Riffe, Lacy 
& Fico 2005, p. 3). As Entman explained, a “content analysis informed by a theory of 
framing” avoids the oft-made mistake of researchers to “... neglect to measure the 
salience of elements in the text, and fail to gauge the relationships of the most salient 
clusters of messages - the frames - to the audience’s schemata” (Entman 1993, p. 57). 
). Such an analysis “is essential to finding patterns, based on which scholars and 
researchers can methodically evaluate news media and its use of framing” (Cissel 
2012, p. 70).  
The patterns that this study focuses on include the relationship between public 
discourses and media frames, and the frame dimensions that were used to build these 
frames up. These categories of public discourses, media frames and frame dimensions 
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were qualitatively defined in the above literature review. This section describes the 
coding procedures of these three categories of variables: media frames, public 
discourses and frame dimensions. Also coded were the country and newspaper in 
which the newspaper article (the unit of analysis) was published. 
 
4.2 Research Design: Selection of Media Sources 
As explained before, this analysis involves Dutch, Russian and U.S. media because 
these countries were involved in the incident for different and sometimes conflicting 
reasons. In these three countries, media sources were selected that represent an as 
diverse as possible spectrum of political orientations. This is relevant because the 
political orientation of a media outlet is reflected in the media frames that it employs. 
For the Dutch and U.S. newspapers, political orientation is decided according 
to their left or right-wing orientation. In case there were more than one newspaper that 
represent similar political orientations, the one with the highest reach in terms of 
circulation was chosen. The two U.S. newspapers The New York Times and The 
Washington Times were selected because they show a large difference in terms of 
political orientation. The former is moderate left (Democrat) and the latter is more on 
the right end (Republican) of the political spectrum (Groseclose & Milyo 2005, p. 
1218). Also the two selected Dutch newspapers De Volkskrant and De Telegraaf 
represent a wide variance of political orientations. De Volkskrant is center-left and 
publishes high-quality articles for the highly educated (Bakker & Vasterman 2008, p. 
147; Rietjens et al. 2013, p. 2). De Telegraaf is more right-wing and sensationalist  
(Beus, Boerefijn & Mak 2004, p. 5; Semetko &Valkenburg 2000, p. 104). 
For Russian media it is harder to pin down their complex political orientations 
on a left-right political spectrum. This is because of “Russia’s communist inheritance, 
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transitional circumstances and current political development” (Evans & Whitefield 
1998, p. 1024). A relatively large sample of four Russian newspapers - opposed to 
two Dutch and two U.S. newspapers that represent the Western media - aims to 
capture the complexity of political orientations in Russian media. Furthermore, 
Russian independent newspapers tend to publish smaller amounts of articles with 
more content and in-depth analyses. This is because of their limited financial means. 
They are only read by middle class intellectuals in the big cities and have smaller 
audiences (Lipman & McFaul 2010). Because of the complexity of political 
orientations and the limited reach of Russian independent media, four Russian 
newspapers were included in the sample to make it more balanced. 
The sample of Russian newspapers distinguished two pro-regime papers (i.e. 
government-owned or closely affiliated to the government) and two independent 
newspapers. The political orientation of Russian newspapers is differentiated 
according to Schenk’s approach in her content analysis of nationalist discourse in the 
Stavropol conflicts of May and June 2007 (2012): based on the ownership of the 
newspapers she distinguished federal, corporate, liberal and nationalist newspapers. 
Assuming that differences in ownership of the newspapers points at different political 
orientations, the following four Russian newspapers were selected: the federal-owned 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the corporate/oligarch Komsomol’skaya Pravda and 
Kommersant Daily, and the liberal Novaya Gazeta. The former two are pro-regime 
newspapers: Rossiyskaya Gazeta is founded and owned by the government of the 
Russian Federation (East View Information Services as cited in Schenk 2012) and 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda is owned by Putin-loyalist Oleg Rudnov (Adelaja 2007). 
The editors of Komsomol’skaya Pravda are reportedly close to president Putin, 
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“accompanying him on overseas trips and, in return for such treatment, writing stories 
favorable to the Kremlin” (Panfilov as cited in Schenk 2012).  
Next to the Russian pro-regime newspapers, two independent newspapers 
were included in the sample: the corporate paper Kommersant Daily and the liberal 
paper Novaya Gazeta. Kommersant Daily is owned by Alisher Usmanov, who is the 
head of Gazprominvestholding. He is believed to have bought this newspaper on 
behalf of Gazprom before the elections of 2007 and 2008. After this, the editors have 
expressed worries over his influence on the content of the newspaper (FAPMCRF 
2007 and Humber as cited in Schenk 2012). Kommersant Daily is, however, still 
considered one of the most independent newspapers in Russia (Medetsky 2008). 
Novaya Gazeta is considered to be the most independent newspaper in Russia 
(Medetsky 2008). This newspaper regularly voices criticism of the government. 
 
4.3 Research Design: Selection of Newspaper Articles 
Newspaper articles were retrieved with the help of the LexisNexis database (for 
Dutch newspapers) and search option on the website of the newspaper itself (U.S. and 
Russian newspapers). The selection of articles was limited to the period from July 17
th
 
till July 23
rd
 because very large amounts of articles were published on the topic. This 
period was chosen because there was much uncertainty and moral outrage during the 
first week after the incident. Therefore, media published large amounts of articles 
during this first week: over 500 in the sample of this analysis. During this period of 
uncertainty, lots of conflicting narratives and speculations appeared in the media. At 
the same time, only very little facts were avilable, e.g. a resolution of the UN that 
guaranteed investigators access to the crash site, the bodies of the victims that left 
Donetsk by train, etc. It is particularly interesting to study the coverage of the first 
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week after the tragic event because of circumstances of widespread uncertainty and 
moral outrage. It is important to note, though, that the incident had not a one-week 
news value. The MH17 incident has dominated the lives of many citizens, particularly 
Dutch and Malaysian, and the media coverage in the Nederlands and large parts of the 
world throughout the whole summer of 2014.  
To retrieve newspaper articles, the search terms ‘MH17’ and/or any form of 
the word ‘Malaysian’3 juxtaposed with the words ‘air’, ‘airlines’, ‘Boeing’ and 
‘crash’4 were used. Not taken into account were overview pages and summaries that 
contained merely visuals and videos, references to other articles and media, pages 
with only embedded references to Twitter posts, etc. 
 
4.4 Research Design: Coding Procedures 
The unit of analysis was each newspaper article that mentioned ‘MH17’. The 
variables that were coded include countries, newspapers, media frames, public 
discourses and the frame dimensions of which media frames were composed. This 
section describes how these categories were coded. For more specific coding 
instructions, see the codebook (Appendix I). 
 
4.4.1 Coding Procedures: Newspapers and Countries 
For each newspaper article, the newspaper and country in which it was published 
were coded. Countries included The Netherlands, Russia and the United States. 
Newspapers included De Volkskrant, De Telegraaf, The New York Times, The 
Washington Times, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, Kommersant Daily 
and Novaya Gazeta. 
                                                        
3 Russian: ‘malajzijskij’. 
4 Russian: ‘krušenie’. 
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4.4.2 Coding Procedures: Media Frames 
For each newspaper article, the dominant frame was coded (David, Atun, Fille & 
Monterola 2011, p. 336). The dominant frame was the longest frame in the article that 
was presented as the most salient narrative. The dominant frame is therefore not 
necessarily the primary frame, i.e. the frame that was first mentioned in the news 
article. Also the secondary frame was coded, i.e. a frame that is mentioned only later 
in the article. In case the secondary frame was longer than the primary frame, the 
secondary frame was considered more salient and therefore coded as the dominant 
frame. In case all the frames had the same length, the frame that was first mentioned 
was coded as the dominant frame. 
Firstly, the ‘tragedy’ (1) frame was detected through the explicit usage of the 
words ‘tragedy’, ‘disaster’ or ‘catastrophe’. Also parts that focused merely on ‘what 
happened’ whereas ignoring the actor, were coded as such. Secondly, the ‘terror’ (2) 
frame was detected through a focus on the actor that has committed the (criminal) act 
that led to the tragic event. Thirdly, the ‘conspiracy’ (3) frame is a counter-frame to 
the terror frame. It was detected through alternative explanations of how the incident 
came about, for example the theory that the tragic event was plotted. Fourthly, the 
remainder category of ‘other’ (4) was coded if none of the above frames were 
detected. This category avoids that one of the three frames would become a too 
generic or default frame. If one of the three main frames would become a default 
frame, this would obscure subtleties in the analysis. If the default category was used 
in a small amount of cases, this means that the three main frames in this analysis 
make sense in order to analyze the conflicting framings of the MH17 incident. 
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4.4.3 Coding Procedures: Public Discourses 
The public discourse that was reflected in the dominant frame was coded. Public 
discourses were recognized with the help of the defintions in the literature review. 
The ‘Anti-Russian discourse’ (1) was recognized through statements that are 
clearly related to the discourse of Western dislike of Russia’s undemocratic domestic 
policies and aggressive (neo-)imperialist foreign policy. Anti-Russian discourse was 
for example detected in references to an address by the Prime Minister of Australia in 
which he expressed his anger over Russia’s policies: “Abbott warned that ‘the 
bullying of small countries by big ones, the trampling of justice and decency in the 
pursuit of national aggrandisement and reckless indifference to human life should 
have no place in our world’” (Leonard & McTague 2014).  
The ‘Anti-Ukrainian discourse’ (2) was recognized through references to the 
purported bad intentions of the Ukrainian government. For example: “The Ukrainian 
authorities are using forgeries [of evidence] to blame the separatists for the crash of 
the Malaysian Boeing”.5 
The ‘Anti-American discourse’ (3) was recognized through references to the 
purported bad intentions of the government of the U.S., for example: “It is argued that 
US intelligence agencies together with some Ukrainians could have deliberately 
brought the ill-fated airliner under the attack of a missile in order to afterwards blame 
the [Pro-Russian] separatists and Russia for everything”.6 
The ‘technical discourse’ (4) was coded as such if it was suggested that the 
causes of the MH17 incident were purely technical.  
                                                        
5 “Власти Украины используют фальшивки, чтобы свалить вину за крушение 
малайзийского «Боинга» на ополченцев” (Brusnev 2014). 
6 “… что американские спецслужбы на пару с украинскими могли специально подствести 
злополучный лайнер под удар ракеты, чтобы потом свалить все на ополченцев и Россию” 
(Andreyev 2014). 
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The ‘default category’ (5) was coded in case none of the above public 
discourses was detected in the article. 
 
4.4.4 Coding Procedures: Frame Dimensions 
As described in the literature review, the frame dimensions that were coded included 
the ‘attribution of agency’ (1), ‘specification of the agent’ (2) and ‘description of 
the victims’ (3). The frame dimensions that were used most often in the dominant 
frame were coded. 
 The attribution of agency was coded as ‘active’ or ‘passive’ descriptions. 
These were recognized on the basis of the verbs that were used to describe the 
incident. Firstly, the category of ‘active’ framing was coded when verbs were used 
that described how the incident was “actively caused” (Entman, 1991, p. 11). For 
example, the active verb ‘to shoot down’ bears a strong implication of human agency 
(Entman, 1991, p. 9). Also verbs or descriptions that impy agency but did not mention 
it explicitly were coded as active, e.g. “[t]hose who are guilty for this tragedy will be 
punished”7 and  “those responsible for the airplane crash.”8 Thirdly, the category of 
‘passive’ framing was coded if the incident was described in a passive voice, for 
example ‘[the plane] endured a crash’.9 If the dominant frame in a newspaper article 
contained both active and passive descriptions of the agency, the category with the 
largest amounts of verbs was chosen. If there were as much active descriptions of 
agency as passive, the category that was first used in the dominant frame was coded. 
The specification of the agent coded the actor that was presented as the main 
suspect behind the tragic event in the dominant frame. Most of the time there was 
uncertainty and lack of evidence for stating with certainty who the agent was. 
                                                        
7 “… виновные в трагедии будут наказаны” (Diveyeva 2014). 
8 “... de verantwoordelijken voor de vliegtuigcrash ...” (ANP 2014). 
9 Russian: ‘потерпел крушение’. 
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Therefore, any potential agent that was mentioned was coded. Based on a general 
reading of the coverage of the MH17 incident in Russian and Western newspapers, 
the following agents were coded because they were mentioned most often in the 
overall coverage: pro-Russian separatists
10
 (1), the Ukrainian army
11
 (2) or 
Russian volunteers
12
 (3). It was coded as none (4) in case the article did not mention 
any (potential) agent. It was coded as unknown (5) if the article mentioned several 
potential agents and/or stated explicitly that it was (yet) unknown who is to be held 
responsible. 
The way the victims were described was coded as humanizing (1) or neutral 
terms (2) or not mentioned (3) at all.  
Firstly, descriptions of the victims in humanizing terms (1) were detected 
through extensive descriptions with “rich detail” (Entman 1991, p. 17). Humanizing 
terms often contain adjectives (Entman, 1991, p.17).
13
 
Secondly, descriptions of the victims in neutral terms (2) were detected 
through succint descriptions
14
 in “spare and plain language” (Entman, 1991, p. 17).  
Thirdly, if the article did not mention the victims at all, it is coded as not 
mentioned (3). 
 
 
                                                        
10 Russian: ‘ополченцы’. 
11 Also referred to as Ukrainian soldiers, siloviki or the Ukrainian air forces. Russian: ‘Украинские 
боевики’, ‘силовики’ and ‘Военно-Воздушные Силы Украины (ВВС)’. 
12 Russian: ‘добровольцев’. Also referred to as ‘mercenaries’, i.e. “a soldier who is paid by a 
foreign country to fight in its army” (Online dictionary 2015). 
13 For example ‘innocent human beings’, ‘innocent civilians’, ‘unguilty people’, ‘loved ones’, ‘the 
valuable lifes that have been lost’ and ‘numerous human victims’. 
14 Neutral terms referring to the victims include ‘travelers’, ‘civilians, ‘passengers’, ‘victims’ (Entman 
1991, p. 17), ‘those who died’, ‘298 lives’, ‘crew’, ‘people who were on the plane’ (De Volkskrant 17 
July 2014), ‘bodies of those who died’ (Shkuratova 2014), and enumerations of the nationalities of the 
passengers that were aboard. 
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4.5 Research Design: Qualitative Content Analysis 
The quantitative analysis measured the usage of media frames in different countries, 
the reflection of public discourses in these frames and the dimensions that composed 
these media frames. The qualitative analysis is based upon notes that were kept while 
coding the variables. These notes include examples of media frames that reflected 
public discourses, and examples of frame dimensions that were found in the sample of 
newspaper articles that was analyzed. These examples were integrated with the 
discussion of the quantitative results. This is useful, because in some cases the 
quantitative findings obscure how the media message was actually framed. For 
example, some newspaper articles referred to a certain media frame or public 
discourse but disproved this interpretation explicitly. In such cases, a certain media 
frame was detected and coded as such, but qualitative analysis has to make clear that 
the media message did not present this frame as the most salient explanation. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
5.1 Frequency of Media Coverage on the MH17 incident 
Table 4 shows the amount of coverage on MH17 by each newspaper in the first week 
after the incident. This is relevant because frequency “measures [the] political 
importance” that is addressed to the incident (Entman 1991, p. 9). Table 1 shows the 
frequency of the coverage on the MH17 incident per newspaper, per day and in total. 
These findings show dramatic differences between newspapers in the amount of 
coverage during the first week after the incident: Rossiyskaya Gazeta published 53 
articles on July 18th whereas The Washington Times and Novaya Gazeta published no 
articles at all on July 23rd. It is important to take into account that the incident took 
place on July 17th in the afternoon at about 13.20 GMT. This implies that the coverage 
on the incident could not yet appear in the morning press of that day. There were thus 
naturally less articles published because a significant part of the day had already 
passed. Apart from that, the differences in the amounts of articles that were published 
by different media are large, but the differences in the amount of articles published 
per day are small. The frequency of the coverage of the MH17 incident thus shows 
large differences between newspapers, but not between countries.  
Table 4. Frequency of coverage on the MH17 incident per newspaper in the first week 
after the incident. 
Days/newspapers July
 1
7
th  
Ju
ly
 1
8
th  
Ju
ly
 1
9
th  
Ju
ly
 2
0
th  
Ju
ly
 2
1
st  
Ju
ly
 2
2
n
d  
Ju
ly
 2
3
rd  
T
o
tal 
N
L
 
De Volkskrant 14 18 12 6 23 15 15 103 
De Telegraaf 2 8 2 5 3 11 6 37 
U
S 
The New York Times 11 23 14 13 18 15 20 114 
The Washington Times 5 8 1 2 6 3 0 25 
R
u
ssian
 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta 10 53 21 10 28 22 18 162 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 9 24 10 13 14 15 5 90 
Kommersant Daily 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 13 
Novaya Gazeta 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 6 
Total 52 137 63 50 96 86 66 550 
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5.2 Usage of Media Frames in Newspapers and Countries 
Table 5 shows the usage of media frame per country and per newspaper. Dutch and 
Russian newspapers employed the tragedy frame most often, whereas the U.S. 
newspapers employed this frame rarely (14.9% in The New York Times 8.0% in The 
Washington Times). The U.S. newspapers employed the terror frame significantly 
more often than other newspapers (73.7% in The New York Times and 84.0% in The 
Washington Times). The conspiracy frame was only employed relatively often by the 
Russian pro-regime newspapers (20.0% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda and 6.2% in 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta). The Western and Russian independent newspapers employed 
the conspiracy frame very rarely (1.0% in De Volkskrant and 4.0% in The Washington 
Times) or not at all (De Telegraaf, The New York Times, Kommersant Daily and 
Novaya Gazeta). The default category (‘none’) was detected in low to moderate 
proportions. It was used more often than the conspiracy frame, but much less than the 
tragedy and terror frames. This means that the frames in this study were useful to 
study the conflicting narratives of the MH17 incident. 
 Also within countries, the usage of frames differed per newspaper. De Dutch 
newspaper De Volkskrant employed the terror frame almost twice as often (30.7%) as 
De Telegraaf (16.2%). The Russian independent newspaper Kommersant employed 
the terror frame more often than Novaya Gazeta. The Russian pro-regime newspaper 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda employed the conspiracy frame more oten (20.0%) than the 
government-owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta (6.2%). These differences between 
newspapers are not extremely large. 
 All in all, frame usage differed significantly per country: Dutch and Russian 
independent newspapers employed the tragedy frame most often, U.S. newspapers 
employed the terror frame most often and Russian pro-regime media (particularly 
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Komsomol’skaya Pravda) employed the conspiracy frame most often. The conflicting 
coverage of the MH17 is particularly reflected in the usage of the terror frame U.S. 
and newspapers on the one hand, and the usage of the conspiracy frame by the 
Russian pro-regime newspapers on the other. 
Table 5. Distribution of media frames per country and per newspaper.
15
 
Frames / newspapers Tragedy Terror Conspiracy None (=default) 
The 
Netherlands 
De Volkskrant 55 (54.5%) 31 (30.7%) 1 (1.0%) 14 (13.9%) 
De Telegraaf 26 (70.3%) 6 (16.2%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (13.5%) 
United States The New York Times 17 (14.9%) 84 (73.7%) 0 (0.0%) 13 (9.0%) 
The Washington Times 2 (8.0%) 21 (84.0%) 1 (4.0%) 1 (4.0%) 
Russia Rossiiskaya Gazeta 87 (53.7%) 22 (13.6%) 10 (6.2%) 43 (26.5%) 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 36 (40.0%) 24 (26.7%) 18 (20.0%) 12 (13.3%) 
Kommersant 7 (53.8%) 4 (30.8%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (15.4%) 
Novaya Gazeta 4 (66.7%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 
Total 234 (42.7%) 193 (35.2%) 30 (5.5%) 91 (16.6%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 Table 5 reports the distribution of media frames per country and per newspaper in absolute 
numbers and percentages (of the total amount of usage of the tragedy, terror, conspiracy and 
none category taken together). The frame that was most often used by a newspaper is marked in 
bold.  
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5.3 Linkage of Public Discourses and Media Frames 
With the help of three hypotheses, this study measured to what extent media frames 
reflect public discourses that generalize on the moral nature of the actor. Table 6 
shows the reflection of public discourses per media frame. The largest proportion of 
each media frame did not reflect any of the identified discourses. The public 
discourses that were identified in this study, though, showed also reasonable 
proportions of linkage with each of the media frames. 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hyothesis 1 measured the reflection of the technical discourse in the tragedy frame. 
As shown in table 6, the technical discourse was most often reflected in the tragedy 
frame (11.3%). The linkage of the technical discourse with the tragedy frame differs a 
lot per newspaper, as shown in table 4. Two of the Western newspapers (De 
Volkskrant, The New York Times) and the Russian independent newspapers drew most 
often on the technical discourse when they employed the tragedy frame. Also the 
Russian pro-regime newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta drew relatively often on the 
technical discourse when it employed the tragedy frame. This linkage ranges from 
small proportions (8.9% in De Volkskrant and 9.1% in Rossiyskaya Gazeta) to 
                                                        
16 Table 6 reports the reflection of public discourses in each media frame in absolute numbers 
and percentages (of the total amount of usage of the tragedy, terror, conspiracy and none 
category taken together). The media frame in which a public discourse was reflected most often 
is marked in bold. As the media frames most often reflected none of the identified public 
discourses, the public discourses that were reflected second most often in the media frames are 
also marked in bold. The absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was 
coded in the quantitative analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total 
amount of codings within each category of variables. The highest amounts in each category are 
marked in bold. 
Table 6. Reflection of public discourses in media frames.
16
 
 Tragedy Terror Conspiracy None (=default) 
Public discourse     
Technical 27 (11.3%) 8 (4.0%) 2 (6.3%) 9 (9.3%) 
Anti-Russian  17 (7.1%) 61 (30.3%) 1 (3.1%) 1 (1.0%) 
Anti-Ukrainian 13 (5.4%) 14 (7.0%) 3 (9.4%) 7 (7.2%) 
Anti-American 12 (5.0%) 19 (9.5%) 9 (28.1%) 4 (4.1%) 
None 171 (71.3%) 99 (49.3%) 17 (53.1%) 76 (78.4%) 
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moderate (23.5% in The New York Times) and high (42.9% in Kommersant Daily and 
75.0% in Novaya Gazeta). The only newspapers in which the tragedy frame did not at 
all draw upon the technical discourse were The Washington Times and 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda.  
 A an example of the tragedy frame that drew on a technical discourse included 
an article in Novaya Gazeta on July 18
th
. It opened with the sentence “Yesterday 
evening, Prime Minister Mark Rutte, urgently returned from Brussels, announced a 
day of national mourning.”17 Later in the article, the technical discourse was 
mentioned: “Gorter said that it may have been an accident, but not excluded technical 
failure of the aircraft or an external reason, not specifying what kind of. 
Communication with the cabin crew was lost two hours after departing at 14:15 CET. 
At that time, the aircraft flew over Ukraine at about 50 kilometers from the Russian 
border.”18 
 
 All in all, the results fully support the hypothesis: the technical discourse is 
reflected in the tragedy frame in small to significant proportions, with large 
differences between newspapers but not between countries. 
 
 
                                                        
17 “Накануне вечером премьер-министр Марк Рютте, срочно вернувшийся из Брюсселя, 
объявил национальный траур” (Mineyev 2014). 
18 “Гортер сказал, что это, возможно, несчастный случай, но не исключены техническая 
неисправность самолета или внешняя причина... Не уточнил, какая. Связь с экипажем 
была потеряна через два часа после вылета: в 14:15 по среднеевропейскому времени. На 
тот момент самолет находился над Украиной примерно в 50 километрах от российской 
границы” (Mineyev 2014). 
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5.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 measured the reflection of the Anti-Russian discourse in the terror 
frame. As shown in table 6, the Anti-Russian discourse was most often reflected in 
the terror frame (30.3%). This was the strongest linkage between a media frame and 
public discourse of all the variables in this analysis. As shown in table 7, all the 
Dutch, U.S. and Russian independent newspapers that employed the terror frame, 
drew on the Anti-Russian discourse in moderate to high proportions. Russian pro-
regime newspapers that used the terror frame drew rarely or not at all on the Anti-
Russian discourse (8.0% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda and 0.0% in Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19 Table 7 reports the reflection of the Anti-American discourse in each media frame in absolute 
numbers and percentages (from the total amount of public discourses that were linked to this 
frame). The media frames that reflected the technical discourse most often are marked in bold 
for each newspaper. These data were derived from tables 12, 13 and 14 (Appendix II). See tables 
12, 13 and 14 for more information on how these numbers were collected and calculated. The 
absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was coded in the quantitative 
analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total amount of codings within each 
category of variables. The highest amounts in each category are marked in bold. 
Table 7. Linkage of technical discourse with media frames.
19
 
Frames / newspapers Tragedy Terror Conspiracy 
The 
Netherlands 
De Volkskrant 5 (8.9%) 2 (6.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
De Telegraaf 4 (15.4%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
United States The New York Times 4 (23.5%) 1 (1.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
The Washington Times 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
Russia Rossiiskaya Gazeta 8 (9.0%) 1 (4.0%) 1 (9.1%) 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 0 (0.0%) 2 (8.0%) 1 (5.3%) 
Kommersant Daily 3 (42.9%) 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Novaya Gazeta 3 (75.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
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Table 8. Linkage of Anti-Russian discourse with media frames.
20
 
Frames / newspapers Tragedy Terror Conspiracy 
The 
Netherlands 
De Volkskrant 11 (19.6%) 15 (48.4%) 1 (100.0%) 
De Telegraaf 2 (7.7%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
United States The New York Times 1 (5.9%) 33 (37.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
The Washington Times 0 (0.0%) 8 (38.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
Russia Rossiiskaya Gazeta 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 2 (5.1%) 2 (8.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Kommersant Daily 0 (0.0%) 1 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Novaya Gazeta 1 (25.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
 As shown in table 8, there were large differences between newspapers in the 
extent to which the Anti-American discourse was reflected in the terror frame. In the 
Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant it was much higher (48.8%) than in De Telegraaf 
(16.7%). The U.S. newspapers not merely employed the terror frame very often, but 
also drew upon the Anti-Russian discourse relatively often (37.5% in The New York 
Times and 38.1% in The Washington Times). In the Russian independent newspaper 
the terror frame reflected the Anti-Russian discourse in moderate (25.0% in 
Kommersant) to very high amounts (100.0% in Novaya Gazeta). It is no surprise that 
Russian pro-regime newspapers rarely (8.0% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda) or not at all 
(Rossisyakaya Gazeta) employed the terror frame that reflected the Anti-Russian 
discourse. 
Qualitative analysis shows that the few cases in which the Russian pro-regime 
newspaper Komsomol’skaya Pravda drew on the Anti-Russian discourse, it explicitly 
disapproved of this framing. This was for example done in an article in which the 
British prime minister was quoted. He stated that the MH17 incident “is a direct 
result of Russia’s destabilisation of the situation in an independent country. We 
have to make absolutely clear that, if this intervention will continue, 
                                                        
20 Table 8 reports the reflection of the Anti-Russian discourse in each media frame in absolute 
numbers and percentages (from the total amount of usage of all the public discourses in this 
study). The media frames that reflected the Anti-Russian discourse most often are marked in 
bold for each newspaper. These data were derived from tables 12, 13 and 14 (Appendix II). See 
tables 12, 13 and 14 for more information on how these numbers were collected and calculated. 
The absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was coded in the quantitative 
analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total amount of codings within each 
category of variables. The highest amounts in each category are marked in bold. 
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consequences will follow quickly. It should be made clear that the West will act, 
wrote Cameron in his column in the Sunday Times. At the same time, the British 
Prime Minister, for some reason, did not have the slightest suspicion about the 
involvement of the armed forces of Ukraine in the [MH17] incident, which has 
happened before with a Russian plane.”21 Here, the newspaper refers to the 
shooting down of the Siberian Airlines flight 1812 by the Ukrainian military in 
May 2004 (Aris 2001). After having mentioned the view of the British 
government, the article in Komsomol’skaya Pravda clearly takes a stance against 
this framing in the British newspaper Sunday Times: “The Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs earlier expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that some 
countries allow themselves to make premature conclusions about the causes of 
the disaster, thus putting pressure on the investigation.”22 Qualitative content 
analysis has thus shown that in some cases the Russian pro-regime paper 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda employed the terror frame that draws upon the Anti-
Russian discourse, it did not frame the MH17 incident as such. It is not surprising 
that the Russian pro-regime media rarely or not employed the terror frame that draws 
upon the Anti-Russian discourse; this would be against the interests of the Russian 
government to which these media outlets are closely related. 
 All in all, the results fully support the hypothesis: the Anti-Russian discourse 
is reflected in the terror frame. This was often the case in Dutch, U.S. and Russian 
                                                        
21 ” … это прямой результат дестабилизации Россией ситуации в независимой стране. Мы 
должны абсолютно четко дать понять, что если это вмешательство будет продолжаться, 
то последствия не заставят себя долго ждать. Должно быть понятно, что Запад будет 
действовать, - написал Кэмерон в своей колонке в газете Sunday Times. При этом ни 
малейших подозрений насчетпричастности к инциденту вооруженных сил Украины, уже 
сбивавших в прошлом российский пассажирский самолет у британского премьера отчего-
то не возникло” (Gorelova & Novikova 2014). 
22 “МИД России ранее выразил недовольство по поводу того, что некоторые страны 
позволяют себе делать преждевременные выводы о причинах катастрофы, тем самым 
оказывая давление на ход расследования” (Gorelova & Novikova 2014). 
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independent media, and rarely or not in Russian pro-regime media. The results thus 
show a conflict between the Western and Russian independent media on the one hand 
and the Russian pro-regime media on the other: Western and Russian independent 
media drew often upon an Anti-Russian discourse to generalize on the moral nature of 
the actor that they hold responsible, whereas Russian pro-regime media rarely 
used this framing or disapproved of it. 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 measured the reflection of the Anti-Ukrainian and Anti-American 
discourses in the conspiracy frame. Table 5 shows that the Anti-Ukrainian discourse 
was not often employed and that it was overall most often reflected in the conspiracy 
frame (9.4%). The Anti-American discourse was of all the public discourses in this 
analysis most often reflected in the conspiracy frame (28.1%).  
As shown in tables 6 and 7, the reflection of the Anti-Ukrainian and Anti-
American discourses in the conspiracy frame shows large differences between 
countries. The Anti-Ukrainian discourse was reflected in the conspiracy frame in low 
to moderate proportions in the Russian pro-regime newspapers (18.2% in Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta and 5.3% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda). Also the Anti-American discourse was 
reflected in low to high proportions in the Russian pro-regime newspapers (9.1% in 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta and 42.1% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda). The Anti-Ukrainian and 
Anti-American discourses were never reflected in the conspiracy frame in Dutch, U.S. 
and Russian independent newspapers. 
The usage of the conspiracy frame that reflected the Anti-Ukrainian or Anti-
American discourse differed a lot per newspaper. Whereas Rossiyskaya Gazeta drew 
more often on the Anti-Ukrainian discourse (18.2%), Komsomol’skaya Pravda drew 
more often on the Anti-American discourse (42.1%). The reason for this might be that 
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Rossiyskaya Gazeta is government-owned and does not want to express Anti-
Americanism as if it were a government stance. An example of Anti-Ukrainian 
discourse in Rossiyskaya Gazeta includes an article in which a Ukrainian conspiracy 
theory was contemptuously assessed. The article describes how Ukrainians claim that 
they overheard Cossacks discussing plans to bring down the plane: “After the version 
with the air traffic controller in Luhansk by ‘experts’ from Kiev, anything could 
be expected. It is only unclear why exactly the Cossacks are so disturbing – this 
reminds of the reaction of Europe in 1812-1813, but very strange to hear this 
from representatives of a country that is nowadays even associated with the EU, 
but still considering itself the successor of the Zaporizhian Sich [i.e. a union of 
the Cossacks in the 16th till 18th century].”23 Also Komsomol’skaya Pravda drew on 
the Anti-Ukrainian discourse, for example by starting an article with the sentence 
“The Ukrainian authorities are using forgeries to blame the [pro-Russian] separatists 
for the collapse of the Malaysian ‘Boeing’.”24 In another news article, the same paper 
further elaborates on the likeliness that the Ukrainian military was the actor behind 
the MH17 incident: “… taking into account that the Ukrainian propaganda 
constantly stirred up the flames of an imminent Russian ‘invasion’ by land or by 
air, it can not be excluded that Ukrainian PVO’ers [i.e. air forces] by accident fired 
at the Malaysian ‘Boeing’, taking its spot on the radar screen for a Russian 
plane.”25 
                                                        
23 “После версии с кондиционером в Луганске от киевских ‘специалистов’ можно ожидать 
чего угодно. Неясно лишь, почему так страшны именно казаки - это напоминает реакцию 
Европы в 1812-1813 годах, но крайне странно слышать от представителей страны, хоть и 
ассоциированной сегодня с Евросоюзом, но все же считавшей себя наследницей 
Запорожской сечи” (Mel’nikov 2014). 
24 “Власти Украины используют фальшивки, чтобы свалить вину за крушение 
малайзийского «Боинга» на ополченцев” (Brusnev 2014). 
25 “А если учитывать, что украинская пропаганда постоянно нагнетала страсти о 
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Komsomol’skaya Pravda drew most often upon the Anti-American discourse. 
One article stated for example that “[t]he head of the US Center for Citizen Initiatives 
thinks that the United States bring misfortune to the ordinary people wherever they 
are defending democracy …”26 Another articles shows an interview with a Russian 
aviation expert. On the question why Obama and Kerry keep stating that the missile 
that downed MH17 was shot from separatist controlled territory, he answered: “they 
are doing this in order to put psychological pressure on the members of the 
investigation commission.”27 
Western and Russian independent newspapers employed the conspiracy frame 
only very rarely, but most often not at all. Only De Volkskrant and The Washington 
Times both used it once. The article in De Volkskrant only enumerates conspiracy 
theories that appeared in Russian media. It further suggests that these theories are 
made up, unlikely and probably false. They are called “wild theories” (Lanting 2014): 
“[p]articularly Russian twitterers are pulling out all stops in order to exculpate the 
pro-Russian separatists.”28 If the conspiracy frame is used in Western media, it is 
usually framed as Russian delusions to free the pro-Russian separatists backed by 
Russia from blame.  
The Anti-Ukrainian discourse appeared once in The Washington Times, 
though qualitative analysis shows that the newspaper did not frame the incident as 
such. It merely described the Russian perspective on the incident through Putin’s 
reaction to the circumstances at the crash site and his explanation of the incident: “Mr. 
                                                                                                                                                              
скором «вторжении» России по суше и воздуху, то нельзя исключать, что украинские 
пэвэошники по ошибке пальнули по малайзийскому «Боингу», приняв его отметку на 
экране радара за российский самолет” (Baranets 2014).  
26 “Руководитель американского Центра гражданских инициатив считает, что США 
приносят несчастье простым людям всюду, где они защищают демократию…” (Tennison 
2014). 
27 “… они делают это для того, чтобы оказывать психологическое давление на участников 
комиссии по расследованию” (Baranets 2014). 
28 “Vooral Russische twitteraars en sites halen alles uit de kast om de 
pro-Russische rebellen vrij te pleiten” (Lanting 2014). 
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Putin asserted that Ukrainian troops attacked separatist units near Donetsk almost at 
the same time the pro-Russia forces were handing over the black boxes from the 
MH17 crash to international investigators. ‘Tanks broke through to the railway 
station,” Mr. Putin said at a Russian Security Council session Tuesday. “It was 
shelled. The international experts there could not even look out of the windows’” 
(Boyer 2014). 
All in all the results partly support the hypothesis that the Anti-Ukrainian and 
Anti-American discourses were reflected in the conspiracy frame: this was only the 
case in Russian pro-regime newspapers. The results thus show how the coverage in 
Russian and Western newspapers conflicted: the Russian pro-regime newspapers on 
the one hand employed the conspiracy frame more often than Western and Russian 
independent newspapers on the other. Furthermore, the Russian pro-regime 
newspapers drew significantly more often on the Anti-Ukrainian and Anti-Russian 
discourse. Western media rarely or not drew on the Anti-Ukrainian or Anti-Russian 
discourse. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Linkage of Anti-Ukrainian discourse with media frames.
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Frames / newspapers Tragedy Terror Conspiracy 
The 
Netherlands 
De Volkskrant 0 (0.0%) 2 (6.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
De Telegraaf 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
United States The New York Times 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
The Washington Times 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Russia Rossiiskaya Gazeta 7 (7.9%) 3 (12.0%) 2 (18.2%) 
                                                        
29 Table 9 reports the reflection of the Anti-Ukrainian discourse in each media frame in absolute 
numbers and percentages (from the total amount of usage of all the public discourses in this 
study). The media frames that reflected the Anti-Ukrainian discourse most often are marked in 
bold for each newspaper. See tables 12, 13 and 14 (Appendix II) for more information on how 
these numbers were collected and calculated. The absolute numbers constitute the amount of 
times the variable was coded in the quantitative analysis. The percentages are calculated with the 
help of the total amount of codings within each category of variables. The highest amounts in 
each category are marked in bold. 
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Komsomol’skaya Pravda 5 (12.8%) 6 (24.0%) 1 (5.3%) 
Kommersant 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Novaya Gazeta 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
 
Table 10. Linkage of Anti-American discourse with media frames.
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Frames / newspapers Tragedy Terror Conspiracy 
The 
Netherlands 
De Volkskrant 1 (1.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
De Telegraaf 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
United States The New York Times 0 (0.0%) 4 (4.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
The Washington Times 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
Russia Rossiiskaya Gazeta 5 (5.6%) 8 (32.0%) 1 (9.1%) 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 6 (15.4%) 6 (24.0%) 8 (42.1%) 
Kommersant 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Novaya Gazeta 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
5.4 Frame constructions 
The second research question measured how the media frames of the coverage of the 
MH17 incident in Dutch, U.S. and Russian newspapers were built up. Frame 
constructions rarely differed per country or newspaper, as clear from tables 12, 13 and 
14 (Appendix II). The only frame dimension that differed a lot per newspaper is the 
specification of agency. The final frame constructions are therefore based on the 
overall results of the distribution of frame dimensions and did not take into account 
the small differences in frame composition between countries and newspapers. Table 
11 and figure 2 show the frame dimensions per frame. The following descriptions of 
frame constructions are based on the frame dimensions that were used relatively most 
often in each frame. The frame compositions of the three main frames of the MH17 
incident are also shown in figure 2. 
                                                        
30 Table 10 reports the reflection of the Anti-American discourse in each media frame in absolute 
numbers and percentages (from the total amount of usage of all the public discourses in this 
study). The media frames that reflected the Anti-American discourse most often are marked in 
bold for each newspaper. See tables 12, 13 and 14 (Appendix II) for more information on how 
these numbers were collected and calculated. The absolute numbers constitute the amount of 
times the variable was coded in the quantitative analysis. The percentages are calculated with the 
help of the total amount of codings within each category of variables. The highest amounts in 
each category are marked in bold. 
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Figure 2. Schematic overview of the frame dimensions that compose the three main media frames. 
 
 Firstly, in the tragedy frame (a) the attribution of agency was described in a 
passive voice (67.2%). The agent was not specified in most cases (83.7%). This is 
logical because this frame does not focus on agency. The victims were described in 
humanizing terms (59.8%). 
                                                        
31 Table 11 reports the counts and percentages of each frame dimension in each frame. The 
absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was coded in the quantitative 
analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total amount of codings within each 
category of variables. The highest amounts in each category are marked in bold. 
Table 11. Overview of the distribution of frame dimensions per frame category.
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 Tragedy Terror Conspiracy None (=default) 
Agency (A)     
- Active 77 (32.8%) 187 (95.4%) 22 (73.3%) 12 (13.2%) 
- Passive 158 (67.2%) 9 (4.6%) 8 (26.7%) 79 (86.8%) 
Agency (B)     
- Pro-Russian separatists 22 (9.2%) 80 (37.2%) 3 (9.7%) 2 (2.1%) 
- Ukrainian army 13 (5.4%) 30 (14.0%) 16 (51.6%) 4 (4.3%) 
- Russians 0 (0.0%) 15 (7.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.1%) 
- Not mentioned 200 (83.7%) 86 (40.0%) 11 (35.5%) 86 (91.5%) 
- Unknown 4 (1.7%) 4 (1.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
- Other 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (3.2%) 1 (1.1%) 
Victims     
- Humanizing 51 (21.8%) 25 (13%) 0 (0.0%) 13 (14.3%) 
- Neutral 140 (59.8%) 102 (52.8%) 13 (43.3%) 56 (61.5%) 
- Not mentioned 43 (18.4%) 66 (34.2%) 17 (56.7%) 22 (24.2%) 
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Secondly, in the terror frame (b) the attribution of agency was described in 
an active voice (95.4%). The victims were described in neutral terms (52.8%) or not 
mentioned at all (34.2%). Western and Russian independent media most often 
ascribed agency to the Pro-Russian separatists (53.1% in De Volkskrant, 42.9% in De 
Telegraaf, 50.0% in The Washington Times, 80.0% in Kommersant Daily and 
100.0% in Novaya Gazeta). Russian pro-regime media most often ascribed 
agency to the Ukrainian army (45.2% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda). One U.S. and 
one Russian pro-regime newspaper often not mentioned an agent at all (55.7% 
in The New York Times and 37.0% in Rossiyskaya Gazeta). Probably, Rossisyakaya 
Gazeta is more careful with the idenfication of the actor because this newspaper 
is government-owned. 
It is surprising that Russian pro-regime newspapers in some cases 
mentioned Pro-Russian separatists as the actor (11.1% in Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
and 25.8% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda, as shown in table 13). This would be 
against the interests of the Russian government to which they are closely related. 
Qualitative analysis shows that in some cases the actor was coded as Pro-Russian 
separatists, but that the newspaper merely mentioned this actor in order to 
negate this explanation. For example in an article in Komsomols’kaya Pravda on 
July 20th it is explained that the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott stated 
that Moscow is to be held responsible for the incident. After that, it is described 
how the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Vitali Yarema, has stated that “the 
separatists of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhanks People’s Republics do 
not have Ukrainian missile systems [of the type] ‘BUK’ and ‘S-300’”32. Thus, the 
ascription of agency to Pro-Russian separatists was negated. In another article in 
                                                        
32 “У ополченцев самопровозглашенных Донецкой и Луганской народных республик нет 
украинских ракетных комплексов «Бук» и С-300” (Bas 2014). 
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Komsomol’skaya Pravda it is argued that the ascription of agency to Russian 
volunteers is an “idiotic (i.e. Poroshenkian) version”33 of the incident that should 
not be taken seriously, as well as headlines in English newspapers such as ‘Putin 
killed 300 people’34. Also Rossiyskaya Gazeta disapproved the narratives of the 
Western media: “What could the U.S. media not pay attention to, which even 
before the address of the President of the USA with reference to local experts, 
started voicing assumptions that the Russian military may have been involved in 
the collapse of the Malaysian Boeing.”35 
Thirdly, in the conspiracy frame (c) the attribution of agency was described 
in an active voice (73.3%). Western media ascribed agency most often to Pro-Russian 
separatists (100.0% in De Volkskrant and 50.0% in The Washington Times). The U.S. 
newspaper The Washington Times ascribed agency once to the Ukrainian army. 
Russian pro-regime media accused the Ukrainian army more often (50.0% in 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta and 55.6% in Komsomol’skaya Pravda). The victims were 
described in neutral terms (61.5%) or not mentioned at all (24.2%). Neutral 
descriptions of the victims were used a lot by Rossiyskaya Gazeta. This newspaper 
often included a few neutral, summarizing sentences at the end of each article: “[w]e 
recall that the airliner of ‘Malaysian airlines’ flying from Amsterdam fell over the 
                                                        
33 “В противоположном лагере вижу поэта Бахыта Кенжеева, который пишет, что никаких 
идиотических (т. е. не порошенковских) версий он воспринимать всерьёз не будет …” 
(Prilepin 2014). 
34 “… сегодня сразу десять журналов только в Англии вышло с заголовками "Путин убил 
триста человек..." - это ж цивилизация, свобода, презумпция невиновности и всё, что мы 
так любим; это тебе не фейки по Первому каналу” (Prilepin 2014). 
35 “На что не могли не обратить внимание американские СМИ, которые еще до речи 
президента США со ссылкой на местных экспертов начали озвучивать предположения о 
том, что к гибели малазийского Boeing, возможно, причастны российские военные” 
(Fedyakina 2014). 
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territory of the Donetsk region, carrying 280 passengers and 15 crew members. 
None of those aboard survived.”36 
The main conflict between Russian and Western media was about the actor of 
the MH17 incident. In both the terror frame and the conspiracy frame, Western and 
Russian independent media ascribed agency more often to Pro-Russian separatists or 
Russian soldiers, whereas Russian pro-regime media ascribed agency more often to 
the Ukrainian military. 
  
                                                        
36 “Напомним, что летевший из Амстердама лайнер ‘Малайзийских авиалиний’ упал на 
территории Донецкой области, имея на борту 280 пассажиров и 15 членов экипажа. Никто 
из бывших на борту людей не выжил” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 17 July 2014). 
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6. Conclusion 
This study aimed to analyze the conflicting narratives in the coverage of the 
MH17 incident in Russian and Western media. To that end, a content analysis 
was conducted on newspaper articles in Dutch, Russian and U.S. newspapers. 
This study aimed to measure to what extent the media frames in these three 
countries drew on public discourses, and how these media frame were built up. 
Firstly, this study has shown that media in Russia and the West employed 
conflicting frames in the coverage of the same tragic event: U.S. media employed 
the terror most often whereas Russian pro-regime media employed the 
counterframe of conspiracy relatively most often. All the countries in the analysis 
employed the tragedy frame a lot, though the U.S. employed it significantly less 
often. Secondly, the analysis supported the hypotheses which expected that the 
media frames of the MH17 incident drew on longstanding public discourses that 
generalize on the moral nature of the actor (i.e. the government of one of the 
involved countries). The first hypothesis, which states that the tragedy frame 
reflects the technical discourse, was fully supported: this was the case for all the 
countries and newspapers in the sample. The second hypothesis, which states 
that the terror frame reflects the Anti-Russian discourse more often, was fully 
supported. This was particularly the case in Western and Russian independent 
newspapers and less often in Russian pro-regime media. The third hypothesis, 
which states that the conspiracy frame reflects the Anti-Ukrainian and Anti-
American discourses more often, was partly supported by the results: this was 
only the case in Russian pro-regime media. Thirdly, it was shown that the media 
frames of the MH17 incident were built up as follows: the tragedy frame often 
described the event in a passive voice and contained humanizing descriptions of 
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the victims. The terror and conspiracy frames desribed the event in an active 
voice and focused on the actor. Fourthly, the qualitative analysis has shown that 
media sometimes described media frames that were used in other countries in 
order to disprove them. Thus, Western media often refuted the narratives in 
Russian pro-regime media. Likewise, Russian pro-regime media refuted the 
narratives that were shown in Western media. All in all, these results have 
shown that Western and Russian independent media on the one hand, and 
Russian pro-regime media on the other, framed the MH17 incident in different 
and conflicting ways. This conflict was reflected in the usage of media frames, the 
public discourses that these frames drew upon, and the actors that were 
identified in these frames. 
Though the findings of this study have shown that public discourses and 
media frames may be linked, a theoretical linkage as such is understudied. 
Regarding the research design of this analysis, it has to be taken into account 
that this analysis focused only on a small period. There were no data of the total 
amount of newspaper articles that these media published. These data would 
enable to say more about the importance these media addressed to the incident 
and the strategy they might have followed in their coverage of the incident. 
Further, this research was limited to newspaper coverage. Future research may 
take into account other influential media as well, in particular television. Lastly, a 
tragic event such as the MH17 incident is a “complicated event... open to varying 
interpretations” (Entman 1991, p. 9). Therefore, different interpretations, particularly 
regarding the technical details of the event, were to a certain extent inevitable.  
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8. Appendix I: Codebook 
The following variables have been coded and collected in an excel matrix as follows.  
8.1 Formal Characteristcs 
The unit of analysis is each newspaper article that mentioned MH17. The formal 
characteristics include an identification code for each newspaper article, the date of 
publication, the header or title and the hyperlink through which the article could be 
retrieved.  
Identification code of news article. In the format year/month/deay/abbreviation of 
newspaper/number of article (e.g. 2015/03/15/VK/1). 
 
Date. The date on which the article was published. In the following format: DD-MM-
YYYY. 
 
Headline. The headline of the article. 
 
URL. Hyperlink through which the online article could be retrieved. 
 
8.2 Variables 
Country. Choose one of the following countries. 
1 = The Netherlands; 
2 = United States; 
3 = Russia. 
 
Newspaper. Choose one of the following newspapers names. 
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1 = De Volkskrant; 
2 = De Telegraaf; 
3 = The New York Times; 
4 = The Washington Times; 
5 = Rossiyskaya gazeta; 
6 = Komsomol’skaya Pravda; 
7 = Kommersant; 
8 = Novaya gazeta. 
 
Dominant frame. Choose the frame that was the longest (in terms of length) and thus 
presented as the most salient. 
 1 = Tragedy
37
; 
 2 = Terror
38
; 
 3 = Conspiracy;
39
 
 4 = Other.
40
 
 
Secondary frames. Choose the other frames that were mentioned in the article. 
 1 = Tragedy; 
 2 = Terror; 
 3 = Conspiracy. 
                                                        
37 Coded as such if the incident is explicitly referred to as a ‘tragedy’, ‘disaster’ or ‘catastrophe’.  
38 Coded as such if the shooting down of the plane, either deliberately or accidentally, is presented as 
the main reason for the taking place of the incident. This frame could be identified through active 
framing of the attribution of agency 
39 Coded as such if conspiracy theories or alternative explanations (other than the narrative that the 
plane was shot down from the conflict zone in the Donbass region) are offered. 
40 Coded as such none if the identified frames is detected. 
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Public discourse. Choose the public discourse that is reflected in the primary frame. 
 1 = Anti-Russian discourse; 
 2 = Anti-American discourse; 
 3 = Anti-Ukrainian discourse; 
 4 = Technical discourse 
 5 = None
41
. 
 
Attribution of agency. Is agency described in active or passive terms? In case the 
article contains both active and passive framing, the primary one (mentioned first) 
was chosen. 
  1 = Active;
42
 
 2 = Passive.
43
 
 
Specificatoin of agency. Specification of the agent. More than one agent may be 
coded.  
 1 = Pro-Russian separatists; 
 2 = Ukrainian army;
44
 
 3 = Russian soldiers;
45
 
 4 = None;
46
 
                                                        
41 None of the identified public discourses was reffered to. 
42 Actively: ‘who did wrong’, verbs such as ‘shot down’, ‘downed’, ‘was brought down’ or labels such 
as ‘attack’. Or verbs and descriptions that imply agency, such as “those who are guilty for this tragedy 
will be punished” (Diveyeva 2014). 
43 Passively: passive voice, focusing on ‘what went wrong’ through verbs such as ‘crashed’, 
‘fell out of the sky’, ‘went down’, ‘was lost’, ‘crashed’43, ‘fell [out of the sky]’43, ‘endured a crash’43, 
‘was lost’, ‘went down’, ‘occurence’43, ‘went missing’43. 
44 This category includes descriptions such as ‘Ukrainian fighters’, Ukrainian VVS [= air forces]’, 
‘Ukrainian siloviki’, etc. 
45 Also referred to as ‘volunteers’. 
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 5 = Unknown.
47
 
 
Identification with the victims. In what kind of terms are they described? 
 1 = Humanizing terms
48
; 
 2 = Neutral terms
49
; 
 3 = Not mentioned at all. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
46 The article does not specify a (potential) agent. 
47 Different potential agents are mentioned, but the article explicitly states that it is not clear which of 
the mentioned agent has (most likely) done it. 
48 Coverage contains “rich detail” (Entman, 1991, p. 17) as to evoke empathy and identification with 
the victims, mostly accomplished through the usage of adjectives, e.g. ‘loved ones’, ‘innocent human 
beings’, ‘innocent civilians’, ‘unguilty people’ (Entman, 1991, p. 17). 
49 Victims are made “less visible” in the coverage, discouraging empathy, which is accomplished 
through references to the victims such as ‘passengers’, ‘victims’, ‘298 lives’, ‘the cabin crew’, ‘people 
who were on the plane’, etc. 
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9. Appendix II: Tables of frame construction per newspaper 
 
  
                                                        
50 Table 12 reports the reflection of public discourses and the use of the frame dimensions ‘attribution of agency’, ‘specification of agency’ and ‘descriptions of the 
victims’ in the tragedy frame per country and per newspaper. The absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was coded in the quantitative 
analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total amount of codings within each category of variables. 
Tabel 12. Distribution of frame dimensions within tragedy frame.50 
FFrame dimensions / newspapers Agency Victims Public discourses 
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De Volkskrant 22 (40.0%) 33 (60.0%) 9 (15.8%) 1 (1.8%) 2 (3.5%) 44 (77.2%) 1 (1.8%) 0 (0.0%) 17 (30.9%) 28 (50.9%) 10 (18.2%) 5 (8.9%) 11 (19.6%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.8%) 39 (69.6%) 
De Telegraaf 5 (19.2%) 21 (80.0%) 1 (3.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 25 (96.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (30.8%) 15 (57.7%) 3 (11.5%) 4 (15.4%) 2 (7.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 20 (76.9%) 
U
S
 
The New York Times 13 (76.5%) 4 (23.5%) 4 (23.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0% 13 (76.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0% 6 (35.3%) 11 (64.7%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (23.5%) 1 (5.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (70.6%) 
The Washington 
Times 
1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (50.0%) 
R
u
ssian
 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta 18 (20.5%) 70 (79.5%) 2 (20.0%) 7 (70.0%) 1 (1.0%) 77 (98.7%) 1 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (6.9%) 59 (67.8%) 22 (25.3%) 8 (9.0%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (7.9%) 5 (5.6%) 69 (77.5%) 
Komsomol’skaya 
Pravda 
15(41.7%) 21 (58.3%) 6 (50.0%) 5 (41.7%) 1 (8.3%) 26 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 10 (27.8%) 18 (50.0%) 8 (22.2%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (5.1%) 5 (12.8%) 6 (15.4%) 26 (66.7%) 
Kommersant 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (28.6%) 5 (71.4%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (42.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (57.1%) 
Novaya Gazeta 2 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 1  (25.0%) 3 (75.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (75.0%) 1 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
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51 Table 13 reports the reflection of public discourses and the use of the frame dimensions ‘attribution of agency’, ‘specification of agency’ and ‘descriptions of the 
victims’ in the terror frame per country and per newspaper. The absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was coded in the quantitative 
analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total amount of codings within each category of variables. 
Tabel 13. Distribution of framing dimensions within terror frame.51 
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De Volkskrant 30 (96.8%) 1 (3.2%) 17 (53.1%) 1 (3.1%) 2 (6.3%) 12 (37.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
7 (22.6%) 8 (25.8%) 16 (51.6%) 2 (6.5%) 15 (48.4%) 2 (6.5%) 0 (0.0%) 12 
(38.7%) 
De Telegraaf 6  (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (42.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (66.7%) 1 
(16.7%) 
1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (66.7%) 
U
S
 
The New York Times 84 
(100.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 32 (36.4%) 4 (4.5%) 2 (2.3%) 49 (55.7%) 1 (1.1%) 0 
(0.0%) 
10 
(11.9%) 
54 (64.3%) 20 (23.8%) 1 (1.1%) 33 (37.5%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (4.5%) 50 
(56.8%) 
The Washington Times 21 
(100.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 12 (50.0%) 1 (4.2%) 2 (8.3%) 7 (29.2%) 2 (8.3%) 0 
(0.0%) 
5 (23.8%) 11 (52.4%) 5 (23.8%) 1 (4.8%) 8 (38.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (4.8%) 11 
(52.4%) 
R
u
ssia 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta 19 (82.6%) 4 (17.4%) 3 (11.1%) 8 (29.6%) 5 (18.5%) 10 (37.0%) 1 (3.7%) 0 
(0.0%) 
1 (4.5%) 11 (50.0%) 10 (45.5%) 1 (4.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (12.0%) 8 
(32.0%) 
13 
(52.0%) 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 22 (84.6%) 4 (15.4%) 8 (25.8%) 14 (45.2%) 4 (12.9%) 5 (16.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
1 (4.2%) 14 (58.3%) 9 (37.5%) 2 (8.0%) 2 (8.0%) 6 
(24.0%) 
6 
(24.0%) 
9 (36.0%) 
Kommersant 4 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (80.0%) 1 (20.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
1 (25.0%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)  3 (75.0%) 
Novaya Gazeta 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
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52 Table 14 reports the reflection of public discourses and the use of the frame dimensions ‘attribution of agency’, ‘specification of agency’ and ‘descriptions of the 
victims’ in the conspiracy frame per country and per newspaper. The absolute numbers constitute the amount of times the variable was coded in the quantitative 
analysis. The percentages are calculated with the help of the total amount of codings within each category of variables. 
Tabel 14. Distribution of framing dimensions within conspiracy frame.52 
Dimensions / newspapers Agency Specification of Agency Victims Public discourse 
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De Volkskrant 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(100.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
De Telegraaf                 
U
S
 
The New York Times                 
The Washington Times 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.  0%) 1 
(100.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
R
u
ssia 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta 7 (70.0%) 3 (30.0%) 1 (10.0%) 5 (50.0%) 0 
(0.0%) 
4 (40.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 
(50.0%) 
5 (50.0%) 1 
(9.1%) 
0 (0.0%) 2 
(18.2%) 
1 (9.1%) 7 (63.6%) 
Komsomol’skaya Pravda 13 (72.2%) 5 (27.8%) 0 (0.0%) 10 (55.6%) 0 
(0.0%) 
7 (38.9%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (5.6%) 0 (0.0%) 7 
(38.9%) 
11 
(61.1%) 
1 
(5.3%) 
0 (0.0%) 1 (5.3%) 8 
(42.1%) 
9 (47.4%) 
Kommersant                 
Novaya Gazeta                  
